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8/18/08 |
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Home / Issues / Russian International Nuclear Cooperation |
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Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Congressional Strategic Stability and Security Seminar Series Seminar 4: A Briefing on the Dangers and Benefits of Russia's International Nuclear Cooperation July 19, 2002 Prepared by Ingrid Staudenmeyer Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow On July 19, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) held the final meeting in its 2002 "Seminar Series" for Congressional staff on key issues in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. This seminar addressed issues related to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Russia's international nuclear cooperation. Particular attention focused on Russian reactor sales and other nuclear and high technology assistance provided to Iran and other countries of concern, proposals for Russian imports of foreign spent nuclear fuel, and other issues affecting Minatom's future. Remarks by Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies In recent years, Russia has aggressively sought to export nuclear technology, and has made several deals with states of proliferation concern. The most worrisome cooperation is with Iran. Russia is selling a power reactor for the Bushehr project, but Russian entities are transferring more sensitive fuel cycle technologies to Iran outside Bushehr. In addition to Iran, Russia is selling India two power reactors and fuel for Tarapur in violation of its Nuclear Suppliers Group commitments. Russia is also engaged in nuclear cooperation with Libya, Syria, and Myanmar. None of these sales violates Russia's NPT obligations, all will be under IAEA safeguards, and none involves nuclear weapons technology. But all should be avoided by any responsible country committed to nonproliferation. Why does Russia do it? With the Russian government no longer placing significant orders with the Russian nuclear industry, the industry must export to survive. But geopolitical factors are also important. Russia believes nuclear cooperation can strengthen bilateral relations with recipient states. It particularly wants better relations with Iran, which it expects will be an influential player in the Gulf. Russian assistance to Iran has been a contentious factor in U.S.-Russian relations for over a decade. The U.S. has opposed all nuclear cooperation with Iran, even the sale of power reactors. It has offered incentives to Russia to end cooperation, including joint work on advanced reactors and U.S. support for spent fuel storage in Russia. But Russia has not been willing to terminate the deal. Russia did, however, commit in 1995 to limit its nuclear cooperation with Iran to the Bushehr project. But 1998, however, it was clear that Russian entities were providing fuel cycle technologies to Iran that went well beyond Bushehr, including heavy water production technology, nuclear-grade graphite, and laser isotope separation technology. We raised our concerns with Moscow, and some of the cooperation stopped (e.g., laser isotope separation project). But as George Tenet recently testified, the assistance continues. Russian assistance to Iran got little attention in the first year of the Administration. But now it has risen to the top of the bilateral agenda with Russia. The Administration apparently will soon make a package proposal to the Russians. Following is an approach developed by Gary Samore and Robert Einhorn. Even if Russia continues selling power reactors for Bushehr, the U.S. should be prepared to engage in wide-ranging nuclear cooperation with Russia provided Russia agrees to four conditions:
It is not clear whether these elements will be part of any solution discussed by the U.S. and Russia, but hopefully they will stimulate some creative thinking about solutions. Remarks by Igor Khripunov, Associate Director, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia There are several popular stereotypes of MINATOM and most, if not all, reflect negative perceptions. It is seen as an agency unable to safeguard fissile materials under its jurisdiction, responsible for radioactive contamination of vast territories in the FSU and what is even more important, contributing to nuclear proliferation globally. What is MINATOM and can it be reformed? One way to answer this question is to categorize its international projects by dividing them into non-Western and Western projects. The first group involves Russia's deals and interactions with what are regarded as questionable regimes. Iran is a good case in point. Russia is building one reactor unit in Bushehr and completing the design work for the second. Under the government long-term program of cooperation with Iran, MINATOM would like to build until 2012 a total of six reactors in this country. As of mid-July 2002, Russia was still negotiating an amendment with Iran to the previously concluded agreement enabling it to bring back spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel. In addition, MINATOM has provided assistance to Iran in developing its indigenous uranium mining capability and was poised to help build fuel cycle infrastructure facilities before the Clinton administration intervened and prevented this from happening. Regarding India, MINATOM has a contract for two reactor units at Kundakulam and an option to expand cooperation to six. Russia's nuclear cooperation with India is seen by most countries as a violation of Russia's obligations assumed as a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Russia's cooperation with other states of proliferation concern China (supply of experimental fast breeder as the prototype of Russia's BN-600 and completion of the fourth stage of the enrichment facility with an inherent capability to enrich well beyond 4 percent), Syria (approved bilateral program to build a research reactor), and Libya (contract to modernize Tajurah research reactor). In terms of MINATOM's commercial projects, its research and assistance programs with Western countries are quite impressive in terms of outreach and money involved. Of late, Russia has concluded umbrella research agreements with Japan, South Africa and Brazil raising a total numbers of such agreements to over 30. It has supplied 600 kg of HEU for a research reactor in the Netherlands and is about to sell $10 million worth of Pu-238 to the United States. Russia's nuclear sector is a recipient of multibillion-dollar assistance from the West to safeguard fissile materials, upgrade safety features of its nuclear power plants (NPP) and extend their service life. The major difference between the non-Western and Western categories is that the latter is generating much less cash for the relatively impoverished sector. The only exception to this pattern - the HEU-LEU agreement with an annual revenue for Russia of up to $500 million - has its limitations too. Most of the money is not intended to meet MINATOM's R&D and immediate production needs, while the rest simply disappears into the "black hole" of federal budget. In these circumstances cash-strapped MINATOM will inevitably gravitate towards questionable deals because they do create jobs and generate money for the industry. Is there any way for the West to engage the Russian nuclear sector in a really meaningful way? A positive precedent of such successful engagement is Russia's aerospace industry. It was achieved through Russia's participation in the International Space Station, commercial launches, the Sea Launch Project, sales to the United States of RD-180 rocket engines and other commercial endeavors. Major U.S. aerospace companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin were involved and shared their business expertise with Russian counterparts. As a result, Russia's aerospace industry acquired generous revenues, commercial experience and some elements of business ethics. The Russian Aerospace Agency has a reputation of being the most Western-oriented governmental agency. Its core group of top managers visibly gravitate towards the West and acts with circumspection regarding questionable deals. Export control internal compliance mechanisms at these facilities were largely developed jointly with Western partners and reflect both Russian requirements and Western values. What may be even more important is that the most sensitive from the proliferation point of view component of Russia's aerospace industry has become more transparent than many other comparable industries. There is no denying that Russia continues to leak missile technologies to the outside world, but major aerospace facilities with Western contracts are increasingly export control conscientious. Can a similar model be applied to Russia's nuclear industry? There are some encouraging signs. First, MINATOM is gradually shedding off "untouchable" status and has become a relatively compliant team player. Gone are the times when its first minister Victor Mikhailov openly ignored interagency consultation requirements and projected himself as a preeminent and independent actor on the world scene. During his tenure as the head of MINATOM he single- handedly initiated contracts with Iran and reportedly pledged to supply a fuel cycle infrastructure. Second, President Putin's record in the wake of September 11 tragic events clearly indicates that the continued rapprochement with the United States and the West remains his top priority. The arms control negotiations demonstrated his ability and willingness to make far-reaching compromises when they are justified by Russia's long-term overall security and foreign policy objectives. Third, there are major international projects on the horizon that are likely to engage MINATOM and contribute to more money flow and better employment opportunities in the nuclear sector. They may include an international plutonium disposition agreement as a follow-up of the U.S.-Russian Agreement of September 2000 and prospects for importation into Russia of foreign spent nuclear fuel for storage/ reprocessing (provided MINATOM fully complies with international safety regulations). Fourth, the Bushehr project, according to some recent information, is only marginally profitable and was launched in early 1990s mainly to keep Russia's nuclear power machine building sector busy and prevent it from complete disintegration. Now that MINATOM is successfully resuming its own program of building nuclear power plants inside Russia, there may be additional incentives found for MINATOM to withdraw from questionable projects abroad without jeopardizing jobs in Russia. If the new engagement policy is managed wisely, Iranian projects may be first to go. Iran's strategic importance for Russia seems to be on the decline in the post September 11 period. Moreover, in the past, Russia's foreign policy elite perceived Iran mostly as an important anti-U.S. leverage rather than a loyal friend, ally or partner. Engaging MINATOM is a prerequisite for reforming it and its mentality. But outside engagement is only a partial solution. It must be equally accomplished by domestic and internal efforts to make it more transparent and responsive to the Russian public. Remarks by Sergey S. Mitrokhin, Member of the Russian Parliament (State Duma), Yabloko Faction; Co-Chairman, Russian-European Inter-Parliamentary Working Group on Russian spent nuclear fuel imports Mitrokhin began by noting that the nuclear complex in Russia was developed during the Cold War years with the primary goal of ensuring a nuclear parity with the United States, and that all Minatom activities were subordinate to that task. Russia has always given preference to plutonium for the production of nuclear warheads, and the so-called "industrial reactors [plutonium production reactors]" which are still functioning today. Plutonium production was the focus of not only the military, but also Minatom's civilian sector. In the Chelyabinsk region there is a spent nuclear fuel facility which processes spent fuel from nuclear plants and submarines. The plutonium generated by this facility is accumulated and stored at special storage sites near the facility. Meanwhile, only hundreds of meters away from the production site, the United States is funding the construction of a weapons-grade plutonium storage facility. Mitrokhin explained that this new site is actually encouraging Russian nuclear specialists to increase plutonium production, and this only preserves Cold War mentality within the Russian nuclear complex. The closed nuclear cities of the USSR were a favorable environment for the upbringing of Soviet specialists in the spirit of nuclear rivalry. Many of them, however, are not prepared for life under the new economic conditions, and have found themselves floundering in their attempts to adapt. Today there are very few young specialists wanting to work in the nuclear industry, and the older generation, lacking fresh ideas and mentality, maintains the out-of-date myths of the Cold War. The intent to produce large volumes of plutonium, particularly through continued civilian reprocessing, remains unchanged within Minatom and the Russian nuclear establishment. This goal requires enormous financial resources which the Russian budget currently lacks. This is why nuclear managers in Russia are so enthusiastic about obtaining resources from spent fuel imports. Last summer, legislation permitting the import of spent fuel for processing and storage was successfully passed in the Duma. As a consequence of this spent fuel processing project, however, Mitrokhin emphasized that he (and his party) believe that it will generate a huge amount of radioactive waste and pose a nuclear safety hazard. At the Mayak plant in the South Ural region, more than 500,000 people have already suffered because of the contamination associated with other nuclear activities. The population of Chelyabinsk region drinks water from wells containing plutonium. Children swim in rivers where a plant processing spent fuel dumps its liquid radioactive waste. Mitrokhin stressed that over 90% of the Russian population is against spent fuel import to Russia, thus making it a political and democracy issue as well as one of non-proliferation. Mitrokhin said that it is noteworthy to mention that Minatom is the only department in Russia that has not undergone substantial reform since the end of the Soviet Union. This means that it remains a dual-purpose department, i.e. working for both civil and military purposes. According to the official Russian document entitled Strategy of Atomic Energy Sector Development in Russia in the First Half of the 21st Century, "nuclear technologies will remain the basis of defense capabilities in Russia." The dual purpose of Minatom allows its new managers to use the shield of secrecy to undertake a variety of commercial projects without public knowledge or consent. Minatom's extensive secrecy makes it very hard to audit the Ministry's international projects and certify that they are exempt from corruption. A recent report by the Duma's Accounting Chamber points out that roughly $270 million of foreign aid money that was allocated for radioactive waste processing is missing from Minatom records. In a situation like this, no one can guarantee that the foreign assistance is not being partially retransferred to other projects, including those involving the Russian military. The campaign to pass a decision allowing Russia to import spent fuel is gaining momentum in the United States. According to Mitrokhin, this decision will have the following negative consequences:
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