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RANSAC Nuclear News, April 14, 2006 Compiled By: Roman Sehling A. Russia - Iran
 A. Russia - Iran 1. ...And Launched 164 Uranium Centrifuges In the growing conflict surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, the Russian side has the most unenviable mission: "To answer for the open door," as a high-level source in the Federal Atomic Energy Agency put it. But even the most patient negotiator's patience may run out. The latest prominent announcements by the Iranian leadership about joining "the number of countries possessing nuclear technologies," despite all allowances for the propagandistic nature of such declarations, effectively put an end to what to many had seemed to be the recent fruitful negotiations about creating a Russian-Iranian joint venture for uranium enrichment on Russian territory. The "specially prepared shops," which Rosatom (Federal Atomic Energy Agency) Director Sergey Kiriyenko had repeatedly mentioned, referring to the well-known combine in Angarsk, have not seen any lucrative contracts with Teheran. And judging by all, they never will. His colleague at the negotiations, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran Golyamrez Agazade, announced that his country's scientists and specialists have independently succeeded in enriching uranium to those conditions that are required for production of fuel for an AES (nuclear power plant). And the President of Iran called upon his scientists to step up their efforts in the scope of the nuclear program--so as to organize enrichment on an industrial scale within the shortest possible time, "and to create a full nuclear cycle in the country." It was specifically with this goal in mind that production facilities are being built at an accelerated rate on the territory of the Natanz nuclear center. "I am asking all responsible officials to step up their work on production of fuel for AES," said M. Ahmadinejad, speaking on state television. And, in doing so, he refuted the reproaches and suspicions about a military directionality of these aspirations. The danger of the situation lies in the fact that, if Iran develops and launches uranium enrichment to energy conditions on an industrial scale, then nothing will keep it from producing high enrichment uranium on these same installations for the purpose of developing a nuclear weapon (if it so desires). "They just need to turn it longer," sources at the Urals Electrochemical Combine, where these technologies have been perfected, explained to our correspondent. Moreover, the dependence here is not linear, the ex-head of Rosatom (Federal Atomic Energy Agency), RAN (Russian Academy of Sciences) Academician Aleksandr Rumyantsev invariably emphasizes. In his words, it is most difficult at the initial stage, as it is necessary to deal with large volumes of raw material and shipments, which are always difficult to conceal. But then, when there is already uranium with enrichment level of 3-3.5 percent, all of the subsequent technological processes are localized. They may be performed in comparatively small shops, including deep underground. And finding such unannounced activity by long-range control methods would be very difficult. Therefore, one question has been and remains paramount: Specifically what nuclear club does Iran intend to join? The one to which many states belong--the members of the IAEA, who are developing nuclear energy and a specific fuel cycle in their countries? Or the one that India and Pakistan joined, in fact without an invitation, by creating their own nuclear weapon parallel with the development of nuclear energy? (Correspondent) At the institute that you head up, everyone knows about centrifuges and uranium enrichment. How do you appraise the latest announcements by the Iranian leadership? (Valentin Shatalov) There is nothing sensational about them. They are simply talking about the completed stage of scientific-research and experimental design work. (Correspondent) Can you express any suppositions about where Iran got the equipment for enriching uranium on gas centrifuges? After all, the export of such technologies is strictly controlled. (Shatalov) It is hard to say. But, in any case, I do not see anything Russian there. We must remember that the scientists and specialists from Iran studied and underwent in-service training in France, in the USA, and in other countries. I would not discount their sufficient level of information on these questions. They have doctors and sciences, and their own professorial staff... (Correspondent) The Iranian authorities have announced that they are using only an experimental cascade comprised of 164 centrifuges, which allows them to obtain only low enrichment uranium for the needs of the nuclear power industry. But what number of centrifuges must we be talking about in order to obtain fissionable weapons-grade material--with enrichment within the limits of 90 percent by uranium-235 isotope? (Shatalov) At least 1,000 centrifuges. (Correspondent) In that case, what allowed the Iranian authorities announce their "membership in the nuclear club?" (Shatalov) Evidently the fact that they have all of the capacities to develop nuclear energy in their own country, without any outside assistance. They had announced this even before. Return to Menu 2. Dangerous Enrichment Despite great doubts about their veracity, Iran's high-profile announcements about its successful enrichment of uranium, and even its mastery of thermonuclear synthesis, transform Russia's foreign policy mission in this country into the main task of domestic diplomacy in the world arena. Moreover, due to the specific nature of our counteragent (Iran is one of the most extremist Islamic states of the world, which demonstrates a constant inability to come to agreement either with the West, or with international organizations), global security in this mission is more important than Russian commercial interests and our geopolitical rivalry with the USA. Specific enrichment of uranium in Iran up to 3.5 percent evokes no concern among Russian nuclear specialists. "Any enrichment of uranium under 20 percent is not prohibited by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) rules, and is used for obtaining fuel for AES (nuclear power plants), and not for military purposes," the former head of Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy) and head of the Rosatom (Federal Atomic Energy Agency) Institute of Strategic Stability Viktor Mikhaylov said today. Most likely, he explained, having announced their success in enriching uranium to 3.5 percent, the Iranian authorities were announcing that "they want to talk as equals with the nuclear powers, and that they want to provide their nuclear specialists access to technologies for industrial enrichment of uranium and the full nuclear cycle for fuel production for their AES." In the ex-minister's opinion, "in the nearest time, the Iranian authorities will accept Russia's offer to create a joint enterprise for uranium enrichment on the territory of Russia." Having lost the role of a super-power after the disintegration of the USSR, in recent years Russia has stubbornly been trying to regain its place as an important country in the world geopolitical arrangement, placing the stake on its role as a sort of mediator between the West and the social outcast countries with authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes. For some time, Russia had tried to use its connections with the regime of Saddam Hussein to prevent the incursion of the anti-terrorist coalition into Iraq. Having lost the battle for Ukraine, Moscow continued to actively support the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, even despite the poor personal relations of the Russian and Belarusian presidents. After the break of Uzbekistan from the Americans over last year's bloody suppression of opposition demonstrations in Andijan by the authorities, Russia immediately concluded an alliance agreement with this outcast country as well. Finally, Russia is tied with Iran--which has been in irreconcilable conflict with the Western world for almost 30 years now, ever since the moment of the victory of the Islamic revolution in the country in 1979 and the taking of hostages in the American embassy in Teheran--not so much by geopolitical, as by strictly commercial interests. Moreover, they are specifically in the sphere of nuclear energy. It is specifically Russia that received the contract for construction of the AES in Bushehr, for which, according to the official version of the Iranian authorities, that country's nuclear program is being developed. However, with the victory of the extreme Islamic radical, Teheran Mayor Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad, in the Iran presidential elections last year, the situation surrounding that country's nuclear program heated up to the limit. Ahmadi-nejad publicly threatens development of a nuclear bomb and readiness to use it against Israel. At the same time, Iran is refusing full-fledged cooperation with the IAEA, not allowing that organization's inspectors onto all of its nuclear facilities. The Russian authorities, not wanting to give up their commercial interests, spent many months trying to block the transfer of Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council for the purpose of introducing harsh sanctions against that country. However, in this case, the undoubted economic interests of Moscow (despite the fact that the West also has similar interests, considering the serious oil reserves in Iran) should not serve as a hindrance to coordinated work of Russia and that same USA in bridling Teheran's nuclear ambitions. Russia has asked Iran to create a joint venture on enrichment of uranium on Russian territory. Iran, despite its statements about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, is still not agreeing to such a variant, because then its nuclear developments would automatically fall under the system of international control. Therefore, Russia, wanting to shield Iran from the threat of sanctions or even attempts at a forceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem on the part of the USA, is assuming extremely great political responsibility of world scale. If, in doing so, Moscow wants to regain the status of a capital, where political questions of world significance are resolved, it must prove that the Iranian authorities really do listen to the words of Russian diplomats. As yet, there is no such proof. Iran is leading Russia on in just the same way as it has done both to the United States, and to the entire world community. Considering the extreme radicalism of the Iranian authorities, we should evidently not use Iran as an arena for political rivalry with the Western world. This is not some African banana republic to which, by forgiving a few billion dollars in foreign debt, we then sell arms for a billion and pride ourselves on our commercial prowess. Present-day Iran, with its nuclear ambitions, is one of the main threats to security in the entire world. Therefore, coming to agreement with Teheran--either about total cessation of the nuclear program, or about its placement under strict international control--is more important for Russia in the strategic plane, than getting a big contract from the hands of people who are declaring their readiness to use nuclear weapons against the "infidels." If only because, from the standpoint of Iran's official political and religious doctrine, Russia represents the same hostile "Western world" as the USA or Great Britain. If only because (and we should also not forget this) one of the most important reasons for introducing Soviet troops into Afghanistan was the Ayatollah Khomeini's desire to create an Islamic state with inclusion of the Central Asian republics of the former USSR. The quality of Russia's policy in regard to Iran will be determined not by the sum written into commercial contracts, but by the removal of another global threat to international security. Return to Menu 3. Moscow Deflects Blow From Iran. Tehran Declared Itself Nuclear Power Early, Experts Believe Excerpted: [Sic] was expected in Tehran yesterday. On the eve of his arrival the Iranian leadership declared that Iran had joined the nuclear club. This report was being commented on in all leading capitals yesterday. Washington and Israel displayed the greatest concern. At first Moscow rebuked Tehran for "moving in the wrong direction" but then it once again mentioned the impossibility of a strong-arm solution to the Iranian problem. (Passage omitted) The Rosatom (Federal Atomic Energy Agency) Press Service declared yesterday that this department's official position regarding the Iranian leader's statements has not been formulated. A high-ranking Rosatom staffer, who asked not to be named, emphasized in conversation with 's correspondent: "I see nothing sensational in these statements. It is most likely a question of laboratory experiments with uranium enrichment. There is nothing difficult about obtaining a microquantity of enriched uranium. All these experiments are under IAEA control. But Iran is still very, very far from a genuine nuclear fuel cycle." (Passage omitted) There is no need to change anything at present in Russia's military strategy toward Iran. The Iranians have operational-tactical missiles which can be equipped with nuclear weapons. However, this direction of possible missile danger to Russia is reliably covered by the missile attack early warning system radar at Qabala in Azerbaijan. In addition, a factory-ready missile attack early warning system radar is being created in the south of Russia. So Iranian nuclear operational-tactical missiles will be detected in good time. They will be shot down by S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile systems and the improved S-400's, which even now form the basis of Russia's missile and space defenses. Russia's military-political leadership has time to make the appropriate decision. In addition, Russia has to operate within the framework of the international dialogue between the Eurotroika and Iran. The United States and China must also join this process. Incidentally, precisely China did a very great deal to help Iran to obtain nuclear technologies and infrastructure. But Russia cooperates with Iran only in constructing the peaceful nuclear electric power station at Bushehr. At present Iran is using pilot plants, which utilize 160 centrifuges, to enrich uranium. This is very little to obtain weapons-grade uranium. To produce highly enriched uranium, a bank of centrifuges must consist of several thousand units. Admittedly, Iran did construct such a plant earlier. There are something like 50,000 centrifuges for this in warehouses. But the Iranians halted construction because of international obligations. It was resumed in February this year. In the long term, if the Iranians launch production, they may create a nuclear weapon based on highly enriched uranium in two or three years' time. But Iran does not have the appropriate equipment to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Return to Menu 4. Russia's Former Atomic Minister: Too Early To Say Iran Goes Nuclear It is too early to say Iran has joined the club of nuclear powers, because many other non-nuclear countries have the uranium enrichment capability, Russia's former atomic energy minister, director of the Strategic Stability Institute under the federal atomic energy agency Rosatom, Viktor Mikhailov, has told Itar-Tass. "True, possession of this technology enhances the prestige of the nation that has it. This is Iran's indisputable technological achievement. They are bright guys. But it has no bearing whatsoever on nuclear arms production," Mikhailov said. "The more so, since the point at issue is the production of low-enriched uranium." "That was experimental enrichment of several grams of uranium. Saying that Iran has created the full nuclear cycle is too early," Mikhailov said. "Any enrichment of uranium under the 20-percent level is not prohibited by the IAEA rules and is used in making fuel for nuclear power plants, not for military purposes." Mikhailov believes that "Iranian nuclear scientists are still unable to make fuel for nuclear power reactors, nor can they create a nuclear warhead." To create the full cycle for the production of one's own fuel at least to load a nuclear power reactor only once "there are to be not one and a half hundred centrifuges, but a thousand times more." "There are to be the proper technologies and a very costly set of equipment," Russia's former atomic energy minister said. It is very likely that by declaring their successful enrichment of uranium to a level of 3.5 percent the Iranian authorities in realty expressed the wish "they want to talk to the nuclear powers as equals and want Iranian nuclear scientists to have access to industrial uranium enrichment technologies and the full nuclear cycle to make fuel for their power plant on their own." At the same time Rosatom specialists have recalled that once a country has mastered the uranium enrichment technology in principle, it is five years away from the creation of a nuclear warhead. All IAEA reports point to this risk. In the meantime, Iran has repeatedly stated its nuclear research is purely civilian. Return to Menu 5. Russian Expert: Iran Needs 'Lot of Time' To Access Nuclear Weapons Technology Iran will be unable to increase its uranium enrichment capability to the amount needed to make nuclear weapons in a short time, Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Safe Atomic Power Engineering Development Igor Linge told Interfax on Thursday. "Even a sufficient amount of enriched uranium does not mean possession of nuclear weapons. Raw materials are different from finished products," he said. It will take a lot of time to get access to nuclear weapon technologies, Linge said. He generally agreed with the U.S. Department of State's opinion about the time when Iran may produce enriched uranium, but disagreed on the possible time it would take for Iran to build a bomb. Iran will have enough enriched uranium for making a bomb in 271 days if it gets 3,000 centrifuges, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker said on Wednesday. But if Iran fully uses the Natanz facility and installs 50,000 centrifuges there, they will make enough enriched uranium for a bomb within 16 days, he said. "It is unrealistic to make or purchase 3,000 or 50,000 centrifuges within a short period," Linge said. Return to Menu 6. Iran's nuclear announcement is pure PR move - Russian expert Iran's announcement that it has joined the world's nuclear club is a bluff and a political PR move, an expert at a Russian think tank said Wednesday. "The announcement that Iran can produce nuclear fuel is largely a bluff," said Vladimir Yevseyev, a senior researcher at the Moscow-based Center for Global Security. "What they [Iranian leaders] said about successfully completing the full nuclear cycle in laboratory conditions should not be viewed as a confirmation that the country could launch full-scale production of nuclear fuel." In a televised speech on Tuesday, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said: "I officially announce that Iran has joined the group countries with nuclear technology." The Russian expert said that during the latest experiment Iran had managed to produce only a small amount of low-enriched uranium. "Iran is talking about completing a full nuclear cycle, but actually it has not gone that far because the full cycle includes plutonium separation in addition to uranium enrichment, and the country has made only a few initial steps in this sphere," Yevseyev said, adding that it could take Iran at least three years to accumulate enough high-enriched uranium to create a nuclear weapon. The expert also said Iran could not be considered a member of the world's nuclear club because the country had not yet conducted a single nuclear test. "Therefore, I regard all such statements merely as a bluff - political PR moves designed to apply pressure on the West, and ensure a better negotiating position," he said. Meanwhile, the head of the international affairs committee of the upper house of the Russian parliament, Mikhail Margelov, said he believed Iran would continue its nuclear research. He said the Iranian president's announcement that the country had produced enriched uranium made this intention clear. "Tehran has made us understand the firmness of its position, and its readiness to continue nuclear developments - all this will only complicate further talks," he told journalists. Margelov added, however, that uranium produced by Iran "does not present any direct military threat." Return to Menu 7. Russia Expert Iran Atom Russian Expert Blames US for Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' The Iranian leadership's statement that Iran has joined the group of countries which have nuclear technology indicates that it is prepared to go into a deep conflict with the international community, said Political Research Institute Director Sergei Markov. "In fact, this statement overturns the results of all previous talks with the world community and points to Iran's preparedness to go into a conflict of any depth," Markov told Interfax on Tuesday evening. The Russian expert described the statement as harsh, but said that it does not mean Iran actually possess nuclear weapons. This only indicates that Iran has "its uranium enrichment cycle," he said. Markov also said that the crisis over the Iranian nuclear problem, sparked anew, is rooted in "an absolute inconsistency of the United States' policies." "The crisis suggests that the United States' power has failed to evolve into a leadership capable of uniting the largest countries in an effort to solve global problems," the Russian political scientist said. The U.S. has made a series of bad mistakes, including its argument with Russia over the post-Soviet space, with Europe over Iraq, and with China," he said. Markov said he doubts it would be possible to alleviate the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program in the near future. "Since the world community will not be able to shape any pertinent policy - the U.S. has been the obstacle - the crisis, by all accounts, will linger on, culminating in the emergence of one more nuclear power, then another one, and then more in a chain reaction ," said Markov. Return to Menu 8. Russian Experts: Iran at Initial Stage of Uranium Enrichment Technology It will take Teheran at least two to three years to develop nuclear weapons, given its laboratory uranium enrichment technology, Colonel General Viktor Yesin, ex-chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, told Interfax-Military News Agency on Wednesday. "It will take Teheran at least two to three years to develop nuclear weapons. It is impossible both technically, and technologically to reach the objective earlier," Yesin said, commenting on Iran's statement that it had enriched uranium in laboratory conditions. He said it takes large-scale uranium enrichment to build nuclear weapons. "According to the IAEA, Iran operates about 160 uranium enrichment centrifuges in Natanz, but it takes 50,000 such centrifuges to enrich uranium on a large scale," Yesin said. The IAEA is aware that Iran has mastered centrifuges production, he noted. "However, they have to be assembled, started, and tested, which may take years to do," he said. According to Yesin, the fact that Iran has enriched uranium in laboratory conditions does not breach the NPT Treaty. "It is not banned, and any state is entitled to enrich uranium to be used for peaceful purposes as long as it complies with IAEA agreements," he said. He pointed out that the problem was that Teheran had kept the IAEA in the dark with regards to its nuclear program for a long time. "Such secretiveness leads one to believe that the Iranian program was aimed at developing nuclear weapons," Yesin said. At the same time he thinks that the use of force is unacceptable for solving the Iranian nuclear problem. "It would be better to use IAEA inspectors to pressure Iran into ratifying an additional protocol to the IAEA agreement, which will allow the Iranian nuclear program to be put under control," Yesin said. Alexander Khramchikhin, head of a department in the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, told Interfax-AVN that Iran had unleashed an informational war in response to pressure. "It is a response war of nerves on the part of Iran. It may result in a backlash, when Teheran will not be trusted," Khramchikhin said, commenting on the recent statements of Iranian authorities on testing new missiles, torpedoes, and aircraft. According to him, it was difficult to predict a possible U.S. response to Teheran's claims. "I believe that the U.S. realizes quite well that Teheran is only bluffing. It is next to impossible to win an informational war against the U.S.," Khramchikhin said. Return to Menu B. Russia - India 1. India-Russia-China: Common Agenda The China-Russia-India triangular relationship idea may be traced to Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in 1986. He spelt out then the framework of USSR's relationship with Asia and, in particular with India and China. The end of the Cold War, Russia's transition into a democracy in the 1990s, Sino-Japanese tensions, the rise of China, and finally the resurgence of India will outline a new era of relationship between these three countries. The China-Russia-India relationship issue has been overblown out of proportion ever since it cropped up as an idea in 1999. The so-called "triangle" has been very disappointing so far. This fact needs to be recognized. The main message of this presentation being that this 'legendary triangle' needs a strong infusion of business commonsense. The word "strategic," which has many meanings, is used less frequently these days while defining a Russia-China-India relationship. It is also another matter that all three sides are accusing one another of dragging their feet for the lethargic pace at which this relationship is evolving. Former Russian PM, Yevgeny Primakov, had proposed a Russia-China-India strategic triangle in 1999. The war in Kosovo, in the heart of Europe, had rattled the continent and Primakov was acting as a diplomatic combatant in defending Russian interests. He floated this idea in this backdrop. He clearly had an anti-US intention for formulating this Russia-China-India alliance idea. But, of course he was bluffing. None of these countries will antagonize the US to provide a fillip to this relationship. Maintaining their respective relationship with the US is top priority for all three countries. What happens between Russia-China-India is a matter of deliberations on issues like Central Asia, trade and business opportunities, etc. The relationship must be tailored along the lines of India's relationship with Brazil and South Africa, where there are regular consultations between the respective foreign ministers. But, it is not a strategic relationship. It has been mooted that India is the driving force behind the Russia-China-India triangle, and is at the forefront of the talks that are held regularly. The first meeting was held at the UN, and the second meeting at Vladivostok in May 2005. Both were supposed to be Indian initiatives. There is a perception in Moscow and Beijing that New Delhi is to blame for the slow pace at which this relationship is blossoming. Nevertheless, there have been regular meetings of trade officials and diplomats. There are no official pacts apart from verbal agreements between diplomats i.e. diplomats informing each other about their positions on a number of issues. The items on the agenda for the three countries are: Iran is at present being discussed between the respective foreign ministers and all countries are being very careful as to the positions they adopt. None of the countries are willing to take a stance that completely supports Iran, as it is proving to be an obstinate actor. Global security issues in specific areas like terrorism and security in Central Asia are areas of convergence for the three countries, and they are satisfied with their coordination in this regard. In the last meeting at Vladivostok, Russia proposed setting up a joint-disaster management mechanism. The Asian tsunami had just preceded this event and the need for better coordination in disaster management was the need of the hour. The Russians had earlier proposed this idea on several other fora like ASEAN, APEC, etc. as it was interested to sell disaster management-specific technology, in which it is a specialist. This proposal has been met with an eager response and the matter is still under negotiation. The clarity in the relationship reduces or gets muddled when the main problem is sought to be tackled, and that is economic issues. Although a number of initiatives are under way in bilateral networks between the countries, but a viable platform for all three countries for business has to be approached with renewed vigour by the concerned diplomats. The issue becomes tricky when one looks at geo-strategic issues. Carving Russia's "oil cake" is one such issue. Here, India and China are competitors. Coordination for pipeline routes is also a subject for further discussions. From Russia's point of view, it is profitable to keep hold bilateral talks in this regard as it can secure a better price for its products. The idea of joint-investment projects is a highly politicised issue and is known to have a dubious track record. This trilateral relationship will need some business acumen and less of politics. A firm economic and business foundation has to be laid. Hence, the main idea at Vladivostok was to set up a business council, which would then decide the further course of action. The underlying logic being that the businesspeople will boost economic cooperation and will provide valuable inputs to the respective foreign ministries over its implementation. The Indians have been faulted for having missed an opportunity to host Russian and Chinese delegations early this year. Apart from the inherent suspicion displayed by Russia and China, Russia claims that it is not sure about India's positions on subjects like the setting up of disaster management units. Suspicions about India's commitment to deeper engagement were amplified in the wake of US President George W Bush's visit to India in March. Russian suspicion was much more subdued than that of China. While India might have kept the Russian government in the loop about the Indo-US nuclear deal, it is however, not reflected in the Russian media and intelligentsia. India has to allay Russian and Chinese fears that it has compromised its "independent foreign policy." Returning to the topic of the aborted meeting between Russian, Chinese, and Indian businesspersons, the Indian government is to blame for not arranging the meeting in March. Although it is now slated to be held in April, it is still low priority for India as all its energies are focussed on the Indo-US N-deal. In Moscow, a group of Russian businesspersons are arranging a meeting with their Indian counterparts. Unlike the diplomats, this group thinks that getting the cream of businesspersons is not a good idea until a working bottom-up framework is developed to facilitate businesses to chart unknown areas in other countries as well as in Central Asia. This Russia-India trade council was formed in February 2006 and is still a fledgling entity that will mature by the time Putin visits India this year. This trade council helped the Russian foreign ministry to reject the first draft of Indian proposals, which was "colonial" in nature. That is, it was a case of wrong thinking where the main idea hinged around Russian oil exports, and cheap Chinese labour and products. This model is against Russia's long-term economic strategy. Russia is not content with the status of a "second Saudi Arabia." Although Russia takes its position of being a major oil supplier in a serious manner, yet, Russia wants to base its future economy in trade of high-tech goods, services, and industrial development. Russia seeks high-tech and research based ventures. India has drafted a second set of proposals, which made China suspicious as it saw this development as a result of deeper India-Russia engagement. China basically interpreted Russian designs as efforts to set-up Russian manufacturing facilities in India and China. They were, however, interested in the possibility in a joint-venture to manufacture a cargo plane. This venture can be profitable to all the parties involved. Ideas about energy delivery can also be discussed at the government level. However, the Russia-India Business Council is wary of drawing up too many proposals as they will not take off the ground due to inevitable delays in the subsequent discussions between the concerned parties. Therefore, the Russian idea is that the first meeting must be low-key effort to establish institutional mechanisms. There are Chinese ideas of engaging with the SCO for greater engagement in Central Asia. This idea may bear fruit in April or July. Some issues that emerged during discussion are summarised below. These comments are from the participants as well as Mr Kosyrev. Nuclear Deal: Premier Wen Jiabao has remarked that China has reconciled itself to the Indo-US Nuclear deal. The question of Russia remains. Though Russia has supplied fuel to Tarapur, it is perceived that this move is against the wishes of its people. The reasons for apprehensions over the nuclear deal must be clearly examined. Suspicions arise mainly from a fear of what may lie beneath the deal. American policy around the Russian neighbourhood has been aimed at reducing Russian influence in the region. Also, India's vote on the Iran issue is seen as having been influenced by the deal. However, one must realise that India has always stood alone on nuclear issues. The Iran vote should be seen as largely independent of the deal with the US. Also, the deal reflects a strategic partnership and is not an alliance, and this needs to be understood clearly. It is also important to remember that when one speaks of misunderstanding or wariness about the nuclear deal in Russia, the reference is not to the government but the mid-level public. While the inter-governmental communication is excellent, there is a need to educate and win over public opinion in Russia. Trilateral Cooperation: When Primakov enunciated a trilateral relationship it was more a throwback to the old days rather than the clear enunciation of a policy. It was also in response to a reporter's question and was not part of a prepared speech. India's position today is one where its power and influence is appreciated and as a result its bilateral relations are diverse and complex. Due to this a few problems arise as far as trilateral cooperation is concerned. Besides, China has always emphasised bilateral cooperation over trilateral endeavours. To the extent that the three countries can cooperate on important issues like Iran, the cooperation will be beneficial; however, one must remember that bilateral economic cooperation is always greater than a trilateral arrangement. Thus areas where trilateral cooperation may be significant are limited. Trilateral relations may have been conceptualised in the Cold War, but are no longer relevant. Improved India-China relations, however, have emerged only in the last few years; therefore it would be correct to say that while the hope of better relations exists, the practical policy aimed at the same is missing. The question of seeming Indian reluctance towards trilateral meetings must be understood within the context of recent developments. Though India had proposed at Vladivostok that the next meeting be held in New Delhi, the minister concerned now handles a different portfolio. This change in personnel is bound to alter matters. Also, India has been rather preoccupied with the Indo-US nuclear deal and this may be the reason for the delay of the meeting to April. If it appears that India is dragging its feet on the issue of trilateral meetings, it must be acknowledged that we have a cumbersome decision making process. For Russia though, it would seem that the nuclear deal is what has affected India's willingness to act quickly on trilateral meetings, this may not be true and the time is right for India to allay such fears. Areas of Cooperation: Though areas of trilateral cooperation may be somewhat limited, important areas of bilateral cooperation do exist. The most important being 'energy'. On this issue, however, Russian policy seems somewhat difficult to understand. While Russia is seen as Saudi Arabia in Europe, it supplies gas and oil to Europe without hard bargaining on technology transfers and bargaining only on cost and pricing. The policy towards India and China is very different. Looking at the issue from the Indian or the Chinese perspective, why should technology transfers become a bargaining point when they are not an issue when discussing oil/gas supplies with the EU? This is an issue that needs to be addressed. Russian aspirations of developing its technology industry are well understood but, Russian policy must also take into account the energy needs of its partners. Since the Russian market has displayed limited receptiveness towards traditional Indian consumer products, the focus of trade thus must be high-tech. This is an issue that Putin attempted to address during his 2004 visit. Efforts must therefore, be made to further trade in this area. Cooperation in fields such as disaster prevention could be extremely helpful. Setting up disaster prevention centres would be a good investment because it would employ Russian technology. The common interest of all three states - India, Russia and China could be in Central Asia. While Russia and China already enjoy clout in the region, India would do well to enter in discussions with the two states on how India may engage Central Asia. While a grouping may not be desirable, political support for cooperation is necessary. Improving Relations: Russia appreciates the improved ties between India and China for it no longer needs to balance relations with one or the other. The relations between Russia and India need to be strengthened. The dichotomy between governmental understanding and mid-level perceptions is what must be addressed. Though some have suggested that the Russian government should be responsible for educating its public, others insist that the time is ripe for the Indian government to engage and win-over the Russian people. However, mid-level contact between intellectuals and institutions is what must be encouraged. The declining contact between the respective media and intellectuals in the post-Soviet era must thus be rectified, for it is alarming that public opinion in a state considered a traditional ally by India is not favourable. As trade and communication at all levels grow, bilateral relations will undoubtedly see a vast improvement. Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee: As India and Russia both move to claim their place in the global order, greater cooperation between the two is very desirable. As traditional friends, it is hoped that cooperation between India and Russia continues and is strengthened. The prospect of trilateral cooperation between India, China and Russia, however, will remain somewhat dubious and limited as all three have other pressing concerns and interests that may be better addressed through different arrangements. Return to Menu 2. Passage to India - Russia Looks to Meet India’s Growing Energy Needs The topics of volatile energy markets and the Sino-Indian economic boom often overlap. As these two new regional powers emerge, they will develop greater demands for energy to fuel their expanding economies, pushing up the price of oil further and putting more strain on the markets. For Russia, however, with its vast energy reserves, higher demands for oil and gas do not present the same worry as they do for Western Europe and the United States. Still, for a country anxious about its bleak demographic outlook, the growing populations of India and China, who together make up one-third of the world’s population, have to be a cause for concern. Russian Ambassador to India Vyacheslav Trubnikov seemed to be unfazed by the burgeoning populace of India and China, and their unrelenting procession towards superpower status. Instead, he emphasizes the idea that Sino-Indian demands for energy are in fact a positive factor for Russia. “Yes, both India and China have tremendous human resources, rich histories and unique cultures, and they are both developing very fast in the most advanced spheres of industry,” said the ambassador. “But they lack energy resources, so both countries remain dependent on the rest of the world.” To this end, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told journalists after meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in New Delhi on March 17 that India hopes to receive one million barrels of oil a day from Russia by 2010. “The necessary infrastructure for this is already in place,” the Indian prime minister said. When it comes to gas, the partnership is already in full swing, with Indian energy giant ONGC owning a $2.7 billion 20 percent stake in the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas development project, as well as expressing great interest in the proposed Sakhalin-2 and Sakhalin-3 sites. “India is prepared to take all the gas from the Sakhalin-1 site – probably in liquefied from, and probably on the basis of a swap agreement, to make it economically viable for three countries – for example by involving Japan,” said Ambassador Trubnikov. “We have very good experience with India here – when Iraq sold oil to India at our expense, and we sold our oil to the West at Iraq’s expense. We had a similar deal with Venezuela and Cuba during Soviet times. These swap deals are very efficient and this is an option to deal with the gas in Sakhalin.” Another giant project that could come to fruition during the next decade is the long-discussed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. “This pipeline is tremendously important for India, though I think we are still some years away from its realization yet,” said Jyotsna Bakshi, a specialist on Russo-Indian relations at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. Although the three countries still have many issues to sort out before the pipeline becomes a reality, one major obstacle was removed recently when long-held U.S. objections to the pipeline were tentatively dropped during U.S. President George W. Bush’s visit to South Asia in March. “Unlike some other global powers that have been trying to pursue a policy of dictating to India and Pakistan with which of their neighbors they may or may not establish long-term relations in the oil and gas sector, Russia has always supported the pipeline project,” said Trubnikov. He refused to see the potential pipeline as a threat to Russian interests: “The pace of development in this region is so high that it will easily absorb any amount of hydrocarbons supplied to it, so we in no way see the gas pipeline hampering any future plans to deliver Russian crude oil or liquefied natural gas to India. Moreover the unique experience of Russian companies in pipeline construction with the Blue Stream project means that we are very interested in cooperating on this venture.” Gazprom representatives traveled with Fradkov to Delhi in March to begin discussions on construction of the pipeline, which is expected to cost around $7 billion. For all the attempts to increase oil and gas imports, India is clearly aware of the dangers of fully relying on imports to fuel its economy. “At the moment we have to import 70 percent of our energy, and so it’s not a good strategy to remain reliant on hydrocarbons,” Bakshi said. “For successive Indian leaders, the nuclear issue has been hugely important to the strategy of Indian national development.” Russia is currently at work on the construction of the nuclear plant at Kudankulum in India’s southern Tamil Nadu region, which will feature two reactors of 1000 megawatts each, and will be commissioned in 2008. Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) was in India on April 6 to inspect the plant and hold talks with Indian officials. He became the first Rosatom head to visit the site of India’s nuclear plant, and promised that the Russian specialists aimed to have the plant up and running as soon as possible. There are 24 Russian specialists working at the plant, and 70 percent of the equipment will be imported from Russia. The station has created 8,000 jobs for local residents. Kiriyenko spoke with local schoolchildren and explained to them that the plant would help boost the local economy. He also reinforced the importance of the Russo-Indian partnership, and took a swipe at unnamed Western countries, saying that Russia and India had a robust and friendly mutual relationship, and “unlike some countries, we actually reinforce it with action.” Currently, Russia is unable to increase cooperation with India due to the informal requirements of its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and NSG members are not supposed to supply nuclear fuel to non-member states. As it is, the Russian supply of uranium to the Indian reactor irritated other NSG countries. But after visits to New Delhi by the French and U.S. presidents recently, all signs indicate that this could change. “Russia fully supports the recent U.S. steps, and wants India to be treated differently from other non-signatories to the NPT, because it sees India as a reliable country,” said Vladimir Orlov, director of the PIR Center, a Moscow-based think tank dealing with nuclear issues. “I think that if France, Russia and the United States are agreed that there should be a new approach to India from the NSG, this is something the other members will find very hard to ignore.” Likewise, Trubnikov welcomed the U.S. initiatives, suggesting that they were more likely to prompt further co-operation with Russia than squeeze the Russians out of the market. “We are not worried about other countries entering the market for civilian nuclear energy in India, because the market is huge,” said the ambassador. Moreover, Russia is in a prime position to win new contracts “The role of nuclear energy in India is going to significantly increase in the near future,” Sudhinder Thakur, the executive director of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India told RIA Novosti. “The fact that Russian companies are already working in India clearly gives them an advantage over companies from other countries,” he said. Trubnikov expressed hopes that other countries will follow Russia’s lead in recognizing the uniqueness of India’s situation. “Russia has long been trying to convince its partners that the status quo with regard to India should be changed,” the ambassador said. “India has asserted itself as a country with an impressive democratic setup, a good non-proliferation track record, and strong export control over nuclear technology.” Return to Menu 3. Russia ready to invest in nuclear sector: Kirienko THIRUVANANTHAPURAM: The former Prime Minister of Russia, Sergei Kirienko, who now chairs the Atomic Energy Agency of the Federation, said here on Sunday that his country was ready to consider proposals for investment in the nuclear sector in India if international rules change. Talking to mediapersons at the Russian Cultural Centre here, Mr. Kirienko said Russia was a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and it supported and followed the group's regulations. Investments could be considered after change in the regulations. His comments come against reports that India might open up its nuclear sector for foreign direct investment and that the Nuclear Suppliers Group may dilute some of its stringent regulations. Mr. Kirienko said supply of more reactors to India could also be considered in the same context. International rules regarding controls would have to be followed. He commented that India was a strategic partner of Russia. There was cooperation in different spheres. Mr. Kirienko, who visited the Koodankulam nuclear plant in Tamil Nadu on Saturday, said two of the nuclear reactors there would be commissioned a few months ahead of schedule this year. Work on two other reactors was progressing. Quality and safety of the Russian reactors for the project were being ensured. Earlier, interacting with Russian language students in Kochi through Edusat after inaugurating a special Russian Language Course through Edusat, Mr. Kirienko said the Koodankulam project gave jobs to 8,000 persons. Consul-General of Russia in Chennai Vladislav V. Antonyuk, Vice-Consul and Director, Cultural Centre of Russia in Chennai Stanislav I. Simakov and Director of the Centre Ratheesh C. Nair also spoke at the inaugural function. Return to Menu 4. Indo-Russian group to expedite commissioning of nuke plants A joint Indo-Russian group will be constituted to expedite the commissioning of two Russian-supplied 1000 MW Atomic Power Stations here as soon as possible without compromising on quality and security aspects, said former Russian Prime Minister and head of Federal Agency of Russia for Atomic Energy (Rosatom), Sergei Kiriyenko. After reviewing the progress of construction of the Nuclear plants with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Anil Kakodkar, he told newspersons here that the group would be asked to submit a report in the middle of May. "We will ensure the commissioning of Units one and two without any compromise on quality and security. That is our first priority," Kiriyenko said and added Russia and India had a long standing strategic partnership in dealing with Nuclear power. "We also discussed the prospects of further co-operation of strategic partnership," the head of the Russia's Atomic Energy Agency said. Kakodkar, who was also present said the Russian delegation's visit allowed both the countries to take stock of the progress of the project to ensure the smooth commissioning. He also said the two Units would be commissioned in two phases. Kiriyenko's visit gains significance, especially in the backdrop of increased civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. It was in 1988 that the Indian Government entered into an agreement with the Government of the erstwhile USSR for setting up the plants at Kudankulam in Tirunelveli district. The responsibility of entire plant design and the manufacturing and supply of all equipments, training of manpower for operation lies with the Russian side and the construction of infrastructure, contract management, erection, commissioning of equipments lies with the Indian side, undertaken by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. Return to Menu 5. Russian guided by security interests in LEU deliveries to India Russia delivers low-enriched uranium to India while being guided by security interests, the head of Russia's nuclear power agency said Saturday. "These deliveries are made in line with the main principles of the nuclear suppliers' group," Sergei Kiriyenko said after attending the Kudankulam nuclear power plant. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov earlier made an official visit to New Delhi, during which he said Russia would supply the fuel, adding that supplies were in the two countries' interests and did not contradict international commitments. Moscow's intention to provide India with uranium provoked controversy among international nuclear suppliers. In early March, the United States agreed to share nuclear technology and fuel with India, which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the main tool in international disarmament efforts. India in return pledged to separate its military and civil facilities and open nuclear power plants to UN inspections. The deal, yet to be formalized, is said to be crucial to India's booming economy. Return to Menu C. Nuclear Industry 1. When will the U.S. lift restrictions on Russian uranium exports? Late last week Moscow hosted the fourth national energy forum on "Russia's Fuel and Energy Sector in the 21st Century." The forum organizers and guests agreed that nuclear industry had entered a period of renaissance, which is logical in view of the common intention to reduce the share of hydrocarbons in the global energy balance. However, participants in the roundtable that was held after the forum also pointed to certain "atavisms" in the development of the nuclear industry that do not fit the logic of constructive and equitable energy relations between Russia and the United States. Why the two countries? Russia is the world's main provider of enriched uranium, and is likely to keep this position in the future, while the U.S. stubbornly upholds anti-dumping restrictions on the export of Russian uranium to the American market. Delegates from private U.S. consumers of uranium, who attended the roundtable, clearly spoke for reviewing the policy of the US Department of Commerce regarding Russian suppliers. Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation is for opening markets to various components of the nuclear fuel cycle and to uranium enrichment and conversion services, said the company's Vice President James A. Tramuto. This will allow diversifying the portfolio of suppliers by stipulating work with existing and future nuclear power plans, and in this way ensure the growth of supplies. There are no reasons to keep the restrictions because the situation has changes since their introduction, said James Malone, Vice President of Nuclear Fuels, Exelon, the largest nuclear operator in the US. Jeff Combs, President of the UX Consulting Company, said retaining the restrictions would slow down the development of the nuclear industry. Uranium prices have doubled in the last two years. The world needs Russian uranium, and Russia should keep its leading place on the global uranium market, especially because American companies have 103 nuclear power units and only one fuel supplier in the U.S. This is clearly not enough to ensure the nuclear safety of the country now, let alone in the future when the U.S. will start building 13 new nuclear blocks. As representatives of private companies, we are well aware of this, but the Department of Energy does not want to see the problem, the American guests of the Russian energy forum said. According to Russia's Techsnabexport (Tenex), one of the world's largest producers and exporters of nuclear materials, services and equipment with the annual turnover of $2 billion, Russia has 50% of the world's uranium enrichment facilities. Russian enrichment technologies are the most efficient and profitable in the world. If Russia is given equal conditions with other countries on the global market of the nuclear fuel cycle, it will satisfy 25-30% of the world's demand, said Tenex head Vladimir Smirnov. The anti-dumping restriction on Russia's uranium exports were imposed during the Soviet era, when the Soviet Ministry of Nuclear Energy delivered a huge amount of natural uranium on the world markets, including the United States, sending prices crashing. The anti-dumping procedure was complemented with restrictions on the Russian ministry. As a result, Russia now may operate on the U.S. market only through a special agent, who is actually its rival. But the most paradoxical thing is that the world's most liberal American economy, of which Washington is rightly proud, is doing its best to save the unprofitable domestic producer. In fact, the U.S. uranium producers, who are using the technologies of the dawn of the nuclear era, survive only thanks to the Russian nuclear industry. Russian nuclear technologies have surged far ahead, and uranium export restrictions are doing colossal damage to the Russian enrichment and nuclear generation sectors. Low enriched uranium is not the natural uranium against which the restrictions were designed, but fuel for nuclear power plants (NPP). Russian producers and American consumers cannot understand why enriched uranium, which is a high-tech service, should suffer from the restrictions. But this is not all. The anti-dumping procedure that is being used in the United States and several European countries does not spread to the 1993 HEU-LEU (highly enriched uranium - low enriched uranium) agreement signed for 20 years. Under it, Russia removes 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from its scrapped warheads, converts it into low enriched uranium and delivers it to the Untied States as fuel for American NPPs. The restrictions were suspended for the duration of the investigation, but the U.S. has set a quota stipulating a restrictive 116% duty on uranium exports made in excess of the quota. Russia has exhausted its quota in 2002. It can continue working despite the high duty, said Smirnov, but Tenex would appeal the size of the duty in case of the lifting of the anti-dumping measures. It will rely on the precedent of French company Areva, for which the duty was cut to near zero. The next hearing on the anti-dumping measures is set for May 23 in Washington. Russia will demand the lifting of the discriminating restrictions on Russian deliveries of nuclear materials to the Untied States and Europe. The Economics Ministry and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency of Russia have sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce requesting that the anti-dumping measures regarding Russian suppliers of nuclear materials and services should be lifted and that they should be ensured free access to the American market. The stand taken by the U.S. energy companies promises a positive solution, especially because the implementation of the ambitious nuclear program recently announced by the U.S. administration would be impossible without the liberalization of the American market of nuclear fuel and stable deliveries of Russian uranium. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board. Return to Menu 2. Kiriyenko Is Exploring Possibilities in Asia Russian nuclear industry officials are seriously hoping to complete the construction of the second section of the Mochovce nuclear power plant in Slovakia. The presentation of our plans for the third and fourth blocks of this plant in Levice was a success. An impressive landing party was sent there from Russia to underscore the competitive advantages of these plans and to convince the client of the strength of Russia's overall intentions. The delegation members included representatives of the Kurchatov Institute RNTs (Russian Science Center), the Atomenergoproyekt Institute in St. Petersburg, the Gidropress OKB (Experimental Design Bureau) in Podolsk, and Atomstroyeksport, serving as the national coordinator. The client's side was represented at the negotiations by the Slovenske Elektrarne joint-stock company and Italy's Enel, the company that owns 66 percent of this joint-stock company. The construction of the Mochovce nuclear power plant with its VVER-440 reactors was actually launched pursuant to a 1980 Soviet-Czechoslovak intergovernmental agreement. The first block was completed in October 1998 and the second was completed in March 2000. The construction of the second section of the nuclear power plant was halted in 1992. According to Atomstroyeksport spokesmen, about 70 percent of the construction work had been completed by that time, and the technological portion was about 30-percent ready for operations. After 10 years of uncertainty, the Slovak leadership resolved to finish building the second section of the Mochovce plant and expressed the wish to use as many of the previously completed elements as possible. Using Atomstroyeksport's mediating services, Russian experts conducted an on-site inspection of the state of the equipment and the quality of its storage. This was followed by a preliminary discussion of the possible degree of Russian involvement in the completion of the third and fourth blocks. These consultations are now expected to produce actual agreements. Slovakia considered other bids in addition to the Russian proposals, specifically those of the Czech Skoda Company and a few other European firms competing in this market. Atomstroyeksport spokesmen believe their company has reason to anticipate a lucrative contract. In addition, they are still hoping to win the contract for the construction of the Belene nuclear power plant in Bulgaria. All of the necessary documents for that competitive bidding session have already been submitted. In addition to seeking promising opportunities in Europe, the Russian atom still has its eye on Asia. "Nuclear Industry, China-2006," the largest international exhibition in Asia, just opened in Beijing as one of the events of "Russia Year" in China. The main Russian exporters in this field and the leading scientific research institutes are well represented there. Sun Qin, the head of the China Atomic Energy Authority, was one of the first to visit the Russian exposition. Meanwhile, the head of Russia's Atomic Energy Agency, Sergey Kiriyenko, who was in China recently, will be taking another official trip in a few days. This time he will travel to India, where two blocks of the Kudamkulam nuclear power plant are being built according to Russian plans and with the assistance of Russian experts. Between business trips, the head of Rosatom (Federal Atomic Energy Agency) has managed to make some fundamental personnel decisions in his agency, including decisions affecting members of his own inner circle. Evald Antipenko, one of the main members of the previous Rosatom chief's team, was removed from office as the deputy head of the agency. reported that Antipenko was in charge of finances and of the industry's price, rate, tax, and foreign economic policies and was responsible for investment and strategic planning, including the restructuring of the sector's property. Staffers in the Rosatom press office explained that "the functional duties of the deputy head of Rosatom will now be performed by Tatyana Yelfimova, adviser to the head of the agency." They also reported that she served as an aide to the RF president's plenipotentiary representative in the Volga Federal District, as the deputy plenipotentiary representative, and as the deputy chief of finances and economic administration on his staff and was in charge of interbudgetary relations there before she moved to Rosatom. Tatyana Yelfimova's appointment was the second to dilute the exclusively male crew traditionally standing at the helm of the atomic industry. Anna Belova, familiar to many people from her earlier job at the Russian Railways Open Joint-Stock Company, had been appointed shortly before that as the adviser to the head of Rosatom on restructuring issues. Analysts have suggested that Sergey Kiriyenko is gradually filling his headquarters at No 24/26 Bolshaya Ordynka with the market experts and top managers he knows, because he believes he can only accomplish the required structural changes in the sector and give it the necessary dynamism with their help. Return to Menu 3. Nuclear Reactors Not To Be Built If Public Objects - Official Russia will not launch the construction of nuclear reactors in this or that region if its public is opposed to such projects, director of the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy Sergei Kiriyenko said during a visit to the Volgodonskaya nuclear power plant on Wednesday. Kiriyenko said he had talked with officials from the Rostov region administrations and representatives of the public of the town of Volgodonsk over the construction of the third and fourth reactors of the local NPP. "We are ready for it from the point of view of the demand for energy in the southern federal district, there is such a demand, both the RAO UES electric utility and the Ministry of Industry and Energy have confirmed it. However, the question I asked of regional authorities and the public today is if they agree with it, if they support it, and if they do, we'll go ahead. If there are objections, then we'll finish the second block and take out the issue of the construction of the third and fourth reactors; we'll launch it /construction/ in other regions," he said. At present, there is rivalry between regions for hosting projects to build nuclear power plants, because "three billion dollars are not an easy find." "The regions where nuclear power plants have been built full-cycle, i.e. with four reactors are, as a rule, one of the largest taxpayers, so from the point of view of revenue and jobs, it's very advantageous," the Rosatom chief said. "For example, the construction of the third and fourth reactors means thousands of highly paid jobs, it's large taxes," he said. He underlined the commitment to the principle "never to go against a coordinated position of regional authorities and the public." Return to Menu 4. What the papers say: "American nuclear producers ask for Russian uranium" U.S. nuclear consumers are lobbying for the 116% antidumping duty on Russian uranium imports to be abolished. If they succeed, Tenex (Techsnabexport), Russia's leading nuclear exporter, will enter the U.S. market of low-enriched uranium. Russia can meet over half of America's nuclear fuel demand, but officials say it cannot hope to gain more than $2-3 billion annually. Uranium prices in the United States have soared by 13% already this year. Last year's growth stood at 80%. Jeff Combs, the president of Ux Consulting Company, a leader in American nuclear consulting, said that prices had stalled the industry's development and that the U.S. needed supplies from Russia. At present, 50% of the fuel spent annually by U.S. nuclear power plants comes from Russia. But current fuel supplies are part of a non-profit contract, as low-enriched uranium falls under the HEU-LEU program, which converts high-enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads into low-enriched uranium to then be converted into nuclear fuel for U.S. commercial reactors. The program, part of a non-proliferation agreement between the U.S. and Russia signed in 1993, will be shut down in 2013. Russia has been a problematic partner. In 1991, Russian producers placed a huge amount of natural uranium on the market and sent prices plunging. It was then that the 116% antidumping duty was introduced. "The United States is dubious about Russian nuclear products," Tenex deputy head Valery Govorukhin said, adding that the company could promise potential partners that Russia would never again play with prices. Russian suppliers could take up half of the American market. "Only half of Russia's capacities supply its domestic market, the rest can be exported," Govorukhin said. This is quite feasible as uranium production in Russia is becoming more efficient, he said. However, a source in the Federal Agency for Nuclear Power said that the company should not expect to gain more than $2-3 billion annually. Original source: Biznes Return to Menu 5. Russia Eager to Get Back to U.S. Uranium Market Russia’s Economic Development Ministry and Federal Atomic Energy Agency have forwarded a letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce urging it to lift antidumping duties that narrow access of Russia’s exporters of nuclear materials to the U.S. market. The U.S. International Trade Commission may decide to cancel the 14-year long restrictions already this fall. The United States set up the 116-percent barrier to Russia’s uranium in 1991, Galina Manilovskaya from Tekhsnabexport reminded at the yesterday’s round table dedicated to antidumping actions and attended by representatives of Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Russia’s biggest supplier of uranium, Tekhsnabexport, and U.S. power companies. In part and in whole, the deliveries stopped once the quotas went up in 2002. Maintaining restrictions for Russia’s uranium is “the absolute archaism” today, when the energy resources fail to completely make up for the global demand, said Tekhsnabexport General Director Vladimir Smirnov. Russia has 615,000 tons of uranium in explored resources, Vladimir Servetnik, deputy GD at Tekhsnabexport, said not long ago. Yakutia’s Elkon is the biggest of the recently explored deposits; its resources are estimated at 344,000 tons. Chita Region’s Streltsovskoe ore-bearing field has 150,000 tons of uranium and Russia may produce 70,000 tons more in Transbaikalia and other regions of Eastern Siberia. Return to Menu 6. Russia mulls uranium production abroad - official Russia is planning to produce uranium abroad while actively prospecting new deposits at home, a senior official at the country's nuclear-technology exporter said Monday. "We intend to produce uranium around the world," said Vladimir Smirnov, general director of Techsnabexport, the state-controlled uranium supplier and provider of uranium enrichment services. "We are interested in reviving uranium markets in Africa and other countries." South Africa, Namibia and Niger rank among the world's top 10 uranium producers. Smirnov also said that shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union production of uranium had been concentrated in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while only one deposit was explored in Russia. He said Russia should also expand uranium prospecting on its own territory to avoid a future nuclear fuel deficit as demand from its nuclear power industry grows. Smirnov's deputy, Vladimir Servetnik, said in February that demand for uranium in Russia could grow from 8,300 tons in 2006 to 18,000 tons in 2020, and the country could face a shortage of uranium after 2035 if prospecting did not increase sharply in the near future. Vladimir Bavlov, deputy head of the Federal Agency for the Management of Mineral Resources, earlier said that Russia's current uranium reserves stood at 830,000 tons, but that they would be depleted by 2015 if the country did not invest at least $10 billion in prospecting and increased uranium production to consumption levels by that time. Return to Menu D. Nuclear Forces 1. Designer announces changes in Russian nuclear missiles Russia will announce changes in its strategic nuclear capability by the end of the year, said Yury Solomonov, head and chief designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), the designer of ground- and sea-launched nuclear missiles. The chief designer, who has the ground-launched Topol-M (SS-25 Sickle) and the sea-launched Bulava-30 (SS-NX-30) intercontinental ballistic missile systems on his record, did not enlarge on details but stated that Moscow would have no less than 2,000 nuclear warheads by 2011, when the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) will be nearing expiry. This is in line with the SORT's requiring that both sides should reduce their nuclear stockpiles to 1,700-2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The statement was prompted by a question how Russia was going to maintain the SORT-approved number of warheads as many decommissioned 10-MIRV R-36MUTTKh/R-36M2 Voevodas (SS-18 Satan) and six-MIRV UR-100NUTTKhs (SS-19 Stiletto) were being replaced every year by single-warhead silo-based and road-mobile RT-2PM2 Topol-Ms. "I cannot answer this question in detail right now," Solomonov said. "This is a confidential issue pertaining to the relations between our country and the United States. However, we are going to notify Washington of upcoming changes in our strategic nuclear forces within two months, and, I think, the information will become public by the end of the year." Importantly, Solomonov said Russia was ahead of the rest of the world in missile defense penetration capability by at least 15 to 20 years. In the light of his earlier remarks that technologically both new missiles could carry no less than three warheads, defense experts are now convinced the announced changes will have to do with the number of warheads per missile. Moreover, media reports, citing Moscow's recent disclosure of a six-MIRV Bulava, designed as part of Russia's effort to implement the Memorandum to START I (expires in 2009), suggested the number of MIRVs per missile was likely to grow to 10 shortly. Solomonov made two other remarks that look important enough if put together. As the first road mobile missile regiment is to enter active service in 2008, the SS-NX-30 also has a three-year flight test program ahead, which means that the first Bulava-armed nuclear submarine Yury Dolgoruky (Project 955 Borei) will be commissioned in the same year and, probably, that the date should be seen as the next landmark for the qualitative development of Russia's nuclear capability. Return to Menu 2. Expert Says Russia Has Met Nuclear Arms Reduction Commitments Moscow has fulfilled its commitment to reduce its number of tactical nuclear weapons, Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin, former head of the Defense Ministry's 12th department in charge of nuclear security, told Interfax-Military News Agency on Thursday. "The U.S. and Soviet decisions to reduce tactical nuclear weapons were unilateral commitments initiated by the presidents. No documents to the effect were signed. Russia has obviously met its commitments," he said, referring to a statement by Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-proliferation Stephen Rademaker. Rademaker said that the United States had met its commitment of tactical nuclear weapons' reduction saying Russia had not. The initiative did not stipulate the complete withdrawal of Russian tactical nuclear warheads from the European part of the country, Maslin said. "It was only a question of reducing the number of specific weapons, for instance artillery or aviation systems. Russia has fully met its commitments. In contrast to American weapons, ours are deployed only on our national territory," he said. The United States is the only nuclear nation which has continued to base nuclear arms abroad, Maslin said. He thinks that the further reduction of tactical nuclear weapons should be discussed only after the withdrawal of American nuclear warheads from Europe. "The U.S. has long wanted to count our tactical nuclear weapons and start negotiating on their reduction. My opinion is that the U.S. should first remove its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and then we can summon all members of the nuclear club, including China, France and Great Britain, for discussing the future of tactical nuclear weapons," Maslin said. Rademaker said on Wednesday that Russia has not fully met its commitments concerning reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. He said none of Russian officials responsible for this matter has told him about Russia meeting its commitments in full. The assistant secretary has a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Russia has tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, too, he argued. Return to Menu 3. Expert: Russia To Have No Less Than 2,000 Nuclear Warheads By 2020 No less than 2,000 warheads will remain in Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces by 2020, said Yury Solomonov, director general and designer general of the Moscow Heat Engineering Institute. "Given the number of warheads Russia is allowed to have in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by 2015, to say nothing of 2020, the missile grouping of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces will have no less than 2,000 warheads," Solomonov said at a news conference at the Interfax main office on Thursday. Solomonov also said that the future makeup of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces is defined on the basis of current international agreements. He recalled the Strategic Offense Reductions Treaty allows the parties, namely Russia and the U.S., to have from 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by the end of 2012. The previous agreement, START, limited the number of Russian and U.S. warheads to 6,000. The Moscow Heat Engineering Institute is the chief developer of the solid-propellant missile for the Bulava sea-based system and Topol-M stationary and mobile ground-based systems that will constitute the core of the Strategic Missile Forces in the future. Return to Menu 4. No Injuries in Russian Submarine Flash Fire A flash fire occurred in a nuclear submarine of Russia's Pacific Fleet during welding operations on Thursday. Smoke filled a compartment, Russian Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo told Interfax on Thursday. "A flash fire occurred and cloth was scorched during welding operations in a submarine at a repair dock in Kamchatka on April 13. As a result, smoke filled one of the submarine's compartments," Dygalo said. "Official documents do not qualify the occurrence as a fire or an accident," Dygalo said. "No one was hurt. The compartment was vented and the repair work resumed," the Navy spokesman said. "There were no flames and no one was hurt. Nor were there any prerequisites for an explosion or radioactive contamination," Dygalo said. Return to Menu 5. Northeast Russia Troops HQ Denies Information on Nuclear Submarine Blaze The Headquarters of Northeast Russia force has officially denied information concerning a blaze aboard a nuclear-powered submarine in the repairing dock at the base in the town of Vilyuchinsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. An officer at the press center of the Northeast force told Itar-Tass on Thursday that "a ship survivability training exercise" had been held on April 12. "A torch pot actuated" in one of the sub's compartments. A fire-fighting team was called in to the scene. The efforts to extinguish "a simulated fire involved servicemen". "There was no blaze" aboard the submarine in actual fact, he emphasised. Thursday's reports about such an incident "are not true to actuality," an officer at the Headquarters of the force stressed. Meanwhile, an officer in the Armament Service of the Main Naval Headquarters told an Itar-Tass correspondent in Moscow that a blaze did occur aboard the submarine. "The blaze that occurred on Wednesday aboard the submarine that lies up in the dock at the base in the town of Vilyuchinsk was immediately put out. There are no problems with the nuclear reactor (of the sub). There were no weapons on board the submarine," the officer said. He underlined that the incident had not entailed radiological contamination hazards. At the same time, an officer at the Vladivostok-based Military Prosecutor's Office (MPO) of the Pacific Fleet told Itar-Tass that the MPO had not received so far any information from Vilyuchinsk about an incident aboard a nuclear-powered submarine. Return to Menu 6. Russian Designer: Bulava Missile May Have Sea, Ground-Launched Versions The chief of the research and development institute that developed the Bulava missile complex has confirmed that the missile can have sea-launched and ground-launched versions. "The national leadership has said more than once the Bulava missile was conceived as an alterable technology that can be reconfigured for both the naval and ground components of the strategic nuclear force. This is really so, and I can confirm this as the chief designer," the head of the Institute of Thermal Engineering, Yuri Solomonov, told the media. Russia in 2006-2008 is to make at least ten launches of the strategic sea-launched missile Bulava before it can enter duty in the Navy in 2008, Solomonov said. Bulava is created as a submarine-based missile complex for two types of missile-carrying strategic submarines - the Dmitry Donskoi (project 941 Akula) and the Yuri Dolgoruky (project 955 Borei), although the submarines' differ greatly in displacement. Return to Menu 7. Russian Expert Says New Liquid-Propellant ICBM Development Inexpedient Solid-propellant ICBMs enjoy undoubted advantages over liquid-propellant ones and will constitute the backbone of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in the future, Yury Solomonov, director and designer general of the Moscow Heat Engineering Institute, told a news conference at the Interfax main office on Thursday. "As far as combat employment is concerned, customers want to have fixed, silo-based, and mobile missile systems in the future. Given great lateral overloads (during transportation), a liquid-propellant ICBM cannot be mounted on a mobile launcher," Solomonov said. According to him, mobile missile systems will be given the priority in the future Strategic Nuclear Forces in 2020-2050. "Mobile ICBMs feature a ten-fold greater survivability after a response strike than fixed ones," he said. Russia has given the U.S. coordinates of all silo-based ICBMs. "Silo-based systems will be destroyed 100% in a retaliatory strike," Solomonov said. According to him, Simultaneous development of liquid- and solid-propellant missiles is economically inexpedient. "It is cheaper to develop a system with a standardized missile," Solomonov said. He pointed out that the U.S., France, China, and Great Britain had already given up developing new liquid-propellant ICBMs. "Only solid-propellant engines are used in new missiles," he underlined. Return to Menu 8. Russian Expert: US Tactical Nukes in Europe Increase Terrorist Threats Deployment of U.S. nuclear stocks in Western Europe is unjustified and increases the terrorist threat, Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin, ex-head of the 12th Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, responsible for nuclear security, told Interfax-Military News Agency on Thursday. "The U.S. is the only state to store its nuclear weapons outside its territory. Existence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe, including Belgium, Italy, and Germany, is unjustified and increases the terrorist threat," Maslin said. He commented on the recent statement of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker that the U.S. had delivered on its promise to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons, deployed in Europe. At the same time he admitted that the U.S. still had its tactical nuclear warheads in Europe. "The nuclear stock was aimed to offset the superiority of conventional weapons of the Warsaw Pact and contain Soviet tank armies. The presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe became unjustified when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Eastern Europe," Maslin said. According to him, U.S. nuclear storage facilities are extra targets for terrorist attacks. "Just imagine what would happen if an aircraft, hijacked by terrorists, crashed on such a facility, say, in Belgium," Maslin said. Europe is divided over U.S. storing its nuclear warhead on its territory, he argued. "The U.S. is coming under more criticism. Thus, U.S. claims that Russia has failed to comply with one or other commitment on nuclear stock reduction, are nothing but at attempt to shift the blame," he said. Return to Menu 9. U.S. State Department: Russia Yet To Carry Out Nuclear Initiative Commitments Russia has not carried out its commitments to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in full, according to the U.S. State Department. "We believe that Russia has not completely fulfilled the Russian side of the presidential nuclear initiatives. No Russian official with responsibility for this matter has ever claimed to me that Russia has fully implemented the presidential nuclear initiative," acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non- Proliferation Stephen Rademaker said at a Wednesday news conference at the Interfax office in Moscow. "Certainly there have been steps taken by Russia, important steps in the direction of fulfilling the presidential initiatives, but those steps fall short of full implementation," he said. In contrast "the United States has fully implemented its undertakings under the presidential nuclear initiative. I am not aware of anyone in the Russian government or elsewhere who questions that the United States has done so," he said. "The United States has a relatively small number of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Russia also has tactical nuclear weapons," he said. Rademaker said President George Bush Snr., and President Boris Yeltsin came up with the initiative of reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. "These were parallel undertakings by the United States and Russia to reduce the level of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each side. They did not reflect an arms control agreement, they reflected parallel unilateral undertakings," he said. Responding to a question, Rademaker spoke of U.S. financial assistance to Russia in the framework of threat reduction efforts and access to Russian nuclear facilities. He said that on the one hand there is the problem of reliable reporting to the U.S. Congress on spending, on the other, "the efforts are perceived as efforts to collect information, one can even say perceived as espionage by the Russian authorities." "So one of the practical challenges in implementing these programs is to strike the balance between our need for accountability and Russia's need to be satisfied that its national security is being protected," Rademaker said. Return to Menu 10. Russia: Academician on Likely Future Improvements in Submarines The improvements in submarines at the present time will not be made in the form of changing generations as it was in the past, but in the course of mass-production of small series of subs, Academician Igor Spassky, director general and designer general of the Rubin naval design bureau, told Interfax-Military News Agency Monday. "It seems reasonable to design sub-series of submarines, introducing something new every five to seven years, which means that no significant improvements in the general design of such subs will be made, while the weapons and internal equipment will be renewed," Spassky said. According to him, such approach reminds one of the second-generation strategic sub development, when 15 years were spent to cover the road from Project 667A to Project 667BRDM designs. "Foreign developers seem to have quite the same ideas," Spassky said. For instance, the U.S. is going to build its Virginia subs in small series so that each new submarine would have more advanced equipment installed, he emphasized and added that large improvements are planned, too. According to him, the seventh Virginia class sub and all followers will have new power plants, based on the principles of motion with the help of a powerful electrically actuated screw. The academician also said that a similar system will be installed in the Russian nuclear subs. "At least, in seven to ten years the design of the sub will be totally reconsidered," he said. He added that the aforementioned approach poses new challenges to the developers. "Modernization of each sub will have to be organized swiftly to keep up with the new sub construction tempo," he said. Spassky is positive that this is quite possible if new state-of-the-art designing methods are introduced, based on up-to-date computer technologies. Return to Menu 11. A Nuclear Tempest in a Teapot: The Tendency Toward Operations Using Force - Is not yet Cause for Alarm About the Author: Reserve Major-General Pavel Semenovich Zolotarev - is a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and a professor of the Academy of Military Sciences. The article in the March issue of the well-known American journal "Foreign Affairs" about the prospect of U.S. fundamental nuclear primacy has caused a totally inadequate reaction in the Russian mass media. But then again, the Russian experts, to whom the journalists turned for their opinions, reacted not to the article but to the assertion about the technical capability of the United States to conduct a surprise nuclear strike against Russia, to which Russia will not be able to retaliate. The experts were placed in the situation of "I haven't read it, but I categorically disagree". The direction of the article of two American political science professors sooner deserves respect and not condemnation. The authors manifest concern about the fact that the United States has set the goal of securing its primacy in military might at the global level, and it has the capability to obtain a fundamental advantage over Russia in the nuclear weapons sphere, which could result in upsetting the parity that has developed. China is not defining its aspiration for a significant increase of its strategic nuclear weapons potential. Under these conditions, a U.S. unilateral primacy could collide with the interests of ensuring Russia's security. The fear that the United States could attempt to use nuclear weapons for the forceful export of democracy and opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the growth of the nuclear potential of other states causes the greatest alarm of the article's authors. Are there grounds to disagree with these assumptions? Perhaps not. The aspiration for complete and global primacy in military might has been openly declared in the last two U.S. National Security strategies. The prospects of the development of strategic nuclear weapons, their role and place, and the views on employment were adequately completely set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review Report, January 8, 2002, and also in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, March 15, 2006. The state and prospects of the development of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces are also not a secret. The quantitative levels of the strategic nuclear weapons are defined by the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials, which was signed by the presidents of Russia and the United States on May 24, 2002, in Moscow. There are problems with the rates of equipping the troops with new strategic platforms. We also know of the problems of the development of the Russian Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN). There are problems, but there is no cause for excessive alarm. What has caused such a violent reaction to the American professors' article? Judging by the reaction in the Russian mass media, the assertion about the possibility that the United States would conduct such a surprise attack against Russia, to which it will not be able to respond, has caused the greatest objection. Russia will not manage to conduct a launch under attack (prior to the American missile's warheads reaching their targets) due to a "breach" in the Missile Attack Warning System and a retaliatory strike (after the nuclear effect) will be impossible because there already will be nothing with which to retaliate. At the same time, this assertion in the text of the article sounds adequately correct. The authors are only suggesting that there is the likelihood that the United States will obtain that capability in the future. On what are the author's assumptions based? The results of computer modeling with the use of standard mathematical methods, which have already been employed for several decades, are laid at the foundation of their findings. The situation of a surprise attack against the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces was modeled. The quantitative parameters of the sides' fighting strength were taken while proceeding from the data, which follows from the Treaty "On the Reduction of the Strategic Offensive Potentials", and also while taking into account the well-known plans of each of the sides for the realization of the Treaty and the development of their strategic nuclear forces. Judging by everything, the authors took into account open source data on the state of the platforms - the approximate number of submarines with strategic missiles on alert duty, the readiness of the strategic bombers to accomplish their combat mission, the reliability of the missiles with extended guaranteed service lives, and so forth. We can assume that the initial modeling data and the range of its variation during the conduct of the calculations by the political science professors were specified in an adequately competent manner but it is totally incorrect to structure the assumptions and all the more so to draw political conclusions on the possible outcome of a surprise nuclear attack by one of the sides based upon these models. Research models have a totally different purpose. Using them, you can research the impact on the effectiveness of the combat employment of the structure of the strategic nuclear forces grouping. You can assess the role of some or other parameters of the platforms and warheads, and the effectiveness of the missile defense system penetration equipment. Using the research models, you can assess the effectiveness of the operation of the SYaS (Strategic Nuclear Forces) depending on the characteristics of the primary and reserve command and control systems and so forth, but no more. It is impossible to draw conclusions on the possible outcome of actual combat operations based upon research models, no matter how improved the mathematical methods and computer modeling. Beyond any reasonable doubt, we can obtain probability assessments on the capabilities of the opposing sides' retaliatory operations during the conduct of a surprise attack against it. But is it correct to draw political conclusions based upon that data? Even if the calculations will show that the probability of retaliatory operations is less than one thousandth, then from here it does not at all follow that you can bet on the conduct of that attack and resort to a policy of strict nuclear deterrence. The randomness of the outcome could be such that one thousandth of a successful launch under attack will be realized in the very first attempt, and there will already be no others. Among the inadequately correct assertions, we can include the reference to the inability of the Missile Attack Warning System to detect missile launches from the water areas of the seas and to the readiness of the naval and aircraft component of the Strategic Nuclear Forces during the assessment of Russia's reaction to a surprise attack. Neither the naval nor the aviation components of the strategic nuclear forces of both Russia and the United States are designed for employment in a launch under attack. They can participate in a full-fledged manner either in a strike that has been prepared beforehand or in a retaliatory strike. Only the Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN) is capable of insuring the conduct of a launch under attack. What is more, that portion of them, which is deployed on mobile platforms, under unfavorable conditions (the country's military-political leadership doesn't made a decision in a timely manner) is capable of constituting the basis of a retaliatory strike. Therefore, the readiness of Russia's naval and aircraft platforms for possible retaliatory operations during the conduct of a surprise attack against the country does not play but the RVSN is constantly at a state of readiness for that situation. As for the Missile Attack Warning System, they are also giving up on it but, on the contrary, its capabilities are gradually increasing. Nevertheless, while rejecting the possibility of the use of modeling research methods to substantiate those assumptions, which were made by the article's authors, it will not be superfluous to analyze the directions of the development of the American strategic forces. Maybe, they will actually be able to acquire those qualities in the foreseeable future, which will permit no single country to claim nuclear parity with the United States? As it follows from the well-known documents, the U.S. strategic forces have been included in the composition of the new triad and the traditional nuclear triad - ground-based intercontinental missiles, missiles on submarines and missiles on aircraft platforms are only a component of the new triad. The functions of the new triad have been set forth in Strategic Command. The spheres of its activities are: nuclear deterrence; space operations; information operations; integrated missile defense; global command and control; the collection, fusion and analysis of information; global strikes; and, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The employment of nuclear weapons is present in the sphere of nuclear deterrence and can be prescribed during the planning of global strikes. They plan to obtain the new qualitative capabilities, which are capable of impacting the effectiveness of the employment of the nuclear forces, during the course of the development of the capabilities for the organization and conduct of global strikes. Global strikes first and foremost are envisioned for those variants of the development of the situation, when new unpredicted threats appear, regardless of their geographic location. The preparation of global strikes must be carried out in real time as a threat emerges with the appearance of targets, which are subject to destruction. The characteristics of the new targets must be determined in real time and, if they are mobile, then with the tracking of their changing coordinates. While taking into account that the conduct of global strikes can also envision the employment of nuclear weapons, from here it follows that the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons against moving targets could substantially increase. It turns out to be a kind of nuclear reconnaissance-strike complex. At the same time, the capabilities for the destruction of fixed hardened targ |
